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THE KURUKSHETRA OF DIPLOMACY

STUDY GUIDE · AGENDA

UNODC

UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME

AGENDA / FOCUS

Addressing the role of illicit drug trafficking and Small Arms and Light Weapons networks in conflict-affected regions in financing armed conflict and non-state armed groups.

31 JUL — 02 AUG 2026

DELHI PUBLIC SCHOOL, SILIGURI

THE KURUKSHETRA OF DIPLOMACY

DELEGATE RESEARCH EDITION

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United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

<u>Agenda Item:</u> Addressing the Role of Illicit Drug Trafficking and Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) networks in Conflict-Affected Regions in Financing Armed Conflict and Non-State Armed Groups.

Letter from the Executive Board

Distinguished Diplomats

We humbly welcome you all to the simulation of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime at Legatio 4.0: The Kurukshetra of Diplomacy. We expect you to read this letter before reading the study guide at large. We have envisioned this committee to be the apt simulation of the Office on Drugs and Crime. The agenda item for the simulation has been set in a holistic manner which would enrich your knowledge of global crises, bridging them with common problems of everyday life. We expect you to have critical analysis skills and to be eager to learn throughout this simulation. Hence, it is expected by us that you will read the Study-Guide religiously to develop a good base of knowledge and research in order to proceed with more at the conference.

The Study Guide has been divided into various sections with the purpose of serving our goal better of making the agenda item streamlined for you. Every section consists of information which shall serve as quintessential for the simulation, hence it is strongly advised that you shall read the Study Guide in the sequential manner.

We expect you to conduct fruitful discussions with your fellow diplomats and the committee at large, do remember that for this simulation negotiations and the ability to achieve consensus is a major factor in order to make this simulation successful.

Lastly, we wish for you to have an enjoyable experience preparing for this simulation and in the scenario of any query which in any way is related to the committee you should feel free to contact the Executive Board via the contact-info given below.

Best Wishes,

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About the United Nations

The United Nations came into being on 24 October 1945, when the UN Charter signed by 50 nations on 26 June 1945 in San Francisco came into force after ratification by the five permanent Security-Council members and a majority of other signatories. The purpose of its founding was to prevent another global war, to promote international cooperation, human rights, and social and economic development. Principal organs within the institutional framework of the UN include the United Nations General Assembly, United Nations Security Council, International Court of Justice, and United Nations Economic and Social Council all combining to effectively make collective decisions on peace, security, law, economic and social issues. As time progressed, the UN's focus have gradually extended to include keeping peace, humanitarian aid, protection of human rights, attainment of sustainable development, and global cooperation for economic and social development. It has grown from founding membership of 51 to 193 member states, becoming the central global forum for diplomacy, international law, social development, and coordinated responses to worldwide challenges.

About Model United Nations

Model United Nations is an academic simulation of the United Nations where students play the role of diplomats representing different countries or organizations and discuss global issues and recreate UN-style committees. At an MUN conference, delegates research their assigned country's policies, write position papers, formally debate and informally negotiate, and then collaborate to write and vote on resolutions related to real-world problems such as climate change, human rights, security, development, and global governance. In this process, participants develop key skills, including public speaking, negotiation, research, diplomacy, teamwork, writing, leadership, and cross-cultural understanding. They also develop a deeper understanding of international relations, multilateral diplomacy, and the complexity of global challenges.

Rules of procedure (ROP)

The committee will be following standard UN4MUN Rules of Procedures.

Opening Statements:- These statements are intended to present a comprehensive overview of your country's position on the given agenda, conveying its perspective on the issue and its approach to addressing it within the international arena. These statements should reflect your country's priorities and concerns, setting the tone for a constructive dialogue while suggesting feasible solutions or strategies that align with its interests and global responsibilities. Through these statements, your country can showcase its commitment to collaborative efforts aimed at resolving the crisis effectively.

THINGS TO KNOW ABOUT THE ROPs:-

After opening statements, the committee would enter into a Round-Robin session where they would focus on sub-topics, moving forward with the documentation procedure and concentrate on looking for practical solutions to the matters. The round-robin session will be chaired by the Executive Board, but the diplomats will have enough flexibility on the floor to prepare several documents, which are expected to be the output of the discussion. After drafting of the documents, the committee is expected to move into formal-session to follow the procedures of adoption of the final document.

Basic Guidelines:-

1. There will be no right of reply in the committee but they'll be allowed to comment on these speeches in the round-robin session.

2. There will be no Moderated and Unmoderated Caucus in this committee, all the subtopic discussions will take place on the floor through round-robin.

3. The committee will have no points or motions, everything will be under the discretion of the Executive Board.

4. The committee will be following a comment, suggestion and rebuttal against a statement made by the diplomat in the formal meetings, however the diplomat is not required to answer any of the comment, suggestion or a rebuttal.

Introduction to the Office

Mandate of UNODC:

The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime is a secretariat office within the United Nations system responsible for supporting the promotion and protection of global security against illicit drugs and international organized crime. Its mandate requires it to assist member states in addressing situations of transnational crime, illicit drug trafficking, corruption, and terrorism around the globe.

Created in 1997 from resolution 51/242, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime formed during a larger overhaul that combined drug control efforts with crime justice programs. Working under the UN Secretariat umbrella, it supports every one of the 193 member nations without standing as a separate organization with its own members. Overseen day to day by dual councils picked by the Economic and Social Council, its path follows guidance from these groups. One council named The Commission on Narcotic Drugs, focuses on narcotic drugs holding seats for 53 countries, shaping policy and direction while a 40 member strong, The Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice tackles rules around preventing crime alongside fair judicial systems.

The Office has the authority to analyze all thematic crime and drug-related issues that require international attention throughout the year. It was created to help governments respond to global security emergencies and systemic corruption, it is tasked with providing technical assistance and research to better implement the rule of law on the ground.

Role and Functions of the UNODC:

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) is the principle United Nations body tasked with the eradication of international organized crime, illicit drug trade, corruption and promotion of criminal economies. In this agenda, UNODC is working to respond to the emerging linkage between the illicit drug trade and Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) networks, which frequently are enabler and revenue generators for armed conflict and Non State Armed Groups (NSAGs) in conflict contexts. UNODC supports Member States in the implementation of international commitments, including the implementation of the international drug control conventions and the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC). The Office does so by providing legislative support, capacity development, cross-border management and coordination, financial investigations and sharing of intelligence and information to help curtail trafficking routes, stop people from smuggling weapons and narcotics across the border and cut off transnational criminal networks that fund and perpetuate armed violence. Moreover, UNODC strives to evidence-based policy making by conducting the strategic threat assessment, trafficking analysis, and technical assistance programmes, including in the field of countering illicit financial flows and bolstering criminal justice capacity. UNODC works to prevent illicit drugs from becoming a source of major revenue for non-state armed groups by combating SALW proliferation, the money-laundering used for financing, and organized crime by strengthening the rule of law and increasing cooperation in conflict-affected areas.

Introduction to the Agenda Item

Understanding Illicit Drug Trafficking:

Illicit drug trafficking is one of the biggest illegal economies in the world, making an estimated USD 400 – 650 billion every year, representing close to 5 per cent of world GDP. Trade funnels and enables transnational organized crime, insurgencies, terror groups or non-state armed groups to secure ongoing revenue sources for recruiting, arms procurement, logistics and controlling territory. Conflict countries, lax governance, corruption, and porous borders make narcotics remain in flux through sophisticated transnational supply lines and financial networks that victimize drug trafficking victims. The Golden Triangle (the region of Myanmar, Laos and Thailand), Golden Crescent (Afghanistan, Iran and Pacific), and Andean Region (Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia), are the world's primary drug producing areas. The Golden Triangle is now one of the world's greatest methamphetamine supply areas, and a major opium production source with hundreds of tonnes of narcotics being trafficked across South-eastern Asia each year and billions of methamphetamine tablets. Historically, the Golden Crescent, mainly Afghanistan, has led the world in illegal opium cultivation with annual production in several years in excess of 6,000 tonnes of opium.

The Andean Region is still the epicenter of its production and cocaine manufacture is now estimated at over 3,000 tonnes a year worldwide, the majority of which takes place in Colombia, Peru and Bolivia, where coca cultivation is proceeding. The police often do not have control over these drug economies, which are often run by a mix of traffickers, organized crime groups, insurgent organizations, warlords and ethnic armed groups in states of limited reach. International measures such as eradication programmes and crop-substitution programmes, alternative development projects, interdiction and increased border security have had little success, especially in the short term. Opium production continued in Afghanistan for many years after the authorities in Pakistan banned cultivation because of insecurity, corruption, dependence of rural people on poppy cultivation and its profitability. Likewise, the control of production in the Golden Triangle has often succeeded in moving production, rather than ending it, and in the Andean Region, production has bounced back after eradication efforts. Hence, illicit drug trafficking is a persistent trans-border business and a prime source of income for non-state armed groups and armed conflict in the world today.

Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALWs):

The United Nations defines "Small Arms and Light Weapons" (SALW) as conventional weapons that are used by an individual or a small group of people. Small arms encompass revolvers, self-loading pistols, rifles and carbines, assault rifles, sub-machine guns and light machine guns while light weapons involve those under 100 mm calibre, such as heavy machine guns and hand-held grenade launchers, recoilless rifles, mortars under 100 mm calibre, man-portable missile systems (MANPADS), and portable anti-tank or anti-aircraft weaponry. A high number of SALWs are being used in today's wars, often in combination with unmanned aerial vehicles, as they are easy to manufacture, portable, low cost, conceal, and last long. Portable, cheap, and easy-to-conceal, with long lives, SALWs are the most common instruments of violence in modern wars and are used in combination with UAVs in several wars today to carry out terrorist attacks, organized crime against civilians, insurgencies, and long-term armed conflicts. These have proliferated widely and occasioned large human suffering such that they are often called by the UN the 'weapons of mass destruction in slow motion'.

Weapons of low and medium technical sophistication (also known as Small Arms and Light Weapons, SALW) are being produced most widely in the world and are the main weapons used in today's wars. Global estimates indicate that there are more than one billion guns in the world, and about 857 million (85%) of these are in civilian hands. Firearms cause over 250,000 direct mortality incidents every year, and in wars they've caused the vast bulk of the deaths of civilians, and helped to displace persons, terrorize communities, and support organized crime activities and non-state armed groups. It is estimated that the international trafficking in SALW is between one and three billion dollars per year, and forms an important part of the conflict economies.

The largest legal small arms and firearms exporters to the world are Italy, Germany, Russia, China, the USA and Belgium. No less than 40–45% of civilian owned guns are in the United States with over 393 million firearms in the hands of civilians, that's more than one person per person. Firearms contribute an estimated USD 90 billion a year to the total economic activity of the U.S. gun industry, and yearly gun deaths in the U.S. total over 45,000; involving homicide, suicide and accidental shooting combined. However, several billion dollars of firearms are exported annually from Italy and Germany, and Russia and China are still important suppliers for military arms production to state and non-state actors, as well as diverting arms to them in the multiple billions of dollars. Industrial guns used in these nations have been found in many conflicts and battles where non-state groups such as the so-called Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), local or regional militias and armed groups in the Sahel, Afghanistan and criminal groups in Latin America have taken part. Investigative work has revealed that non-state actors in Somalia have access to U.S., Russian, Chinese, Belgian, German, and Italian manufactured firearms, mostly found by diversion, battlefield capture, theft from government-owned arsenals, illegal brokering and re-transfers happen during the process.

The Role of Non-State Armed Groups:

Non-State Armed Groups (NSAGs), such as insurgent groups, terrorist organizations, militias, separatist and crime armed networks have become some of the most significant actors of today's armed conflicts. Recent estimates indicate that at least 450 armed groups are currently active in more than 50 countries and today the majority of armed conflicts around the world include at least one NSAG. Their operations have had unprecedented humanitarian effects, a total of over 120 million forcibly displaced persons around the world and millions of civilians under the influence or direct control of armed groups.

NSAGs are becoming more like military-criminal enterprises. In addition to ideology, many have a profit motive to extortion, illegal taxation, kidnapping for ransom, illegal mining, oil smuggling, human trafficking, and control of strategic trade routes and border crossings. Many armed groups in the Sahel region and eastern DRC have been estimated to be generating tens to hundreds of millions of dollars annually from illicit economic activity and territorial control, and the so-called Islamic State (ISIS) reportedly made an estimated USD 1-3 billion annually at its height.

NSAGs possess the economic and military ability to hire soldiers, to enlist the use of advanced weaponry, to set up alternative mechanisms of control and authority, to offer basic social welfare, and to maintain campaigns of violence. In multiple war theatres, scores of hundreds of thousands or even millions of civilians have been under the control of armed groups. Between 2014 and 2015, controlling territory in Iraq and Syria, at its territorial peak the so-called Islamic State (ISIS) governed a population of 8–12 million across swaths of the two countries, collecting taxes, establishing courts, educating its population, and providing public services. Likewise, before the Taliban returned to power in Afghanistan in 2021, they had influence over districts with millions of population, and exercised significant influence on governance and judicial processes outside the central government's reach. As a result, NSAGs are no longer simply actors in conflict but are emerged as strong and influential transnational actors that can help build new security dynamics, destabilize the state and sustain cycles of violent conflict and humanitarian crisis in the region.

Financing of Armed Conflicts:

Financing of armed conflict mainly focuses on generating conflict revenue, i.e revenue generated from the resources that primarily fund armed conflicts, human rights abuses, etc. Financing of armed conflict through *Small Arms & Light Weapons* **(SALW)** happens via a twin mechanism process through the direct monetization of weapons themselves and indirect revenue generation by threat of violence. High levels of political instability, corruption, porous borders and weak rule of law create an unprecedented vacuum which is capitalized on by armed groups and terror organisations.

Funding for the operations of terror organisations and armed groups are acquired by actively selling and trading in **SALW** and by the involvement of victims in **SALW** trafficking in exchange for money or other commodities. Direct financing of terrorism is linked to direct and indirect trafficking of **SALW**. Lucrative activities of the non-state armed groups are primarily focused on **KFR** (Kidnapping for Ransom), **taxation, extortion, armed robberies and trafficking in other illegal goods or contraband.** UNSCR 2462 (2019) and UNSCR 2482 (2019) recognised that terrorist organisations can benefit from transnational organised crime as a source of finance. Oftentimes, armed groups obtain large quantities of SALW [using them as a currency & to secure informal loans.

The rise of the Islamic State, which amassed nearly €5.5 billion at the peak of its territorial control in 2015, is perhaps the most salient example of this. 47 Holding and administering territory has enabled the group to raise millions of euros annually by collecting taxes from inhabitants, charging tariffs and transit fees, and selling pilfered oil via criminal activities, including extortion operations, racketeering, etc. In this sense, SALW serves as an enabler for ISIS and like-minded organisations to engage in a range of conflict revenue-generating activities.

Regional Case Studies

AFGHANISTAN:

Afghanistan is one of the most important nations in the field of illicit drug trafficking, Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) and funding of non-state armed groups. In the last more than 20 years, Afghanistan produced over 80% of the world's illicit opium, and during several years more than 6,000 tonnes of opium was produced every year, reaching levels of over 9,000 tonnes in 2017. It was estimated that the country's narcotics economy was worth billions of dollars each year, and in some years made up a significant portion of the Afghan economy. Opium poppy production was higher in the provinces of Helmand, Kandahar, Farah, Nangarhar and Badakhshan, and these provinces are characterized as having weak governance, insecurity, and a lack of economic opportunity, allowing for the deep-seated illicit cultivation of poppy.

The narcotics supply chain starts with cultivation of opium poppy (Papaver somniferum). Poppy plants are grown for several months and the farmers make shallow cuts into the capsules and let the milky latex flow out and harden into raw opium. Opium that is harvested is gathered and brought to illicit lab facilities where it is converted into morphine base and then chemically processed into heroin with the use of precursor chemicals, such as acetic anhydride. The transaction consists of the intervention of several actors such as farmers, local merchants, operators of laboratories, traffickers, organized criminal networks, corrupt middlemen and insurgent groups. The Taliban and other armed groups reportedly collected significant revenue through taxation on poppy cultivation, checkpoints on poppy trafficking routes, protection services from the poppy cultivation and charges collected from traffickers and laboratories. The estimates are that the Taliban made USD 400 million to USD 1.5 billion per year out of some of the many types of moneymaking activities and the supply of money from narcotics is one of the sources.

There are three major routes for trafficking of Afghan opiates: the Balkan Route (Iran and Türkiye to Europe), the Northern Route (Central Asia to Russia), and the Southern Route (Pakistan). In the history, Pakistan has been one of the major routes for Afghan heroin to reach the ports, along the Arabian Sea and transported to the markets in Middle East, East Africa, South Asia and Europe, especially along the border areas adjoining Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province, which are the main transit areas for drugs. Funds collected for this transnational narcotics economy have allowed armed groups to train and pay warriors, acquire Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW), build logistical infrastructure, and finance

extended killing campaigns. At the same time, the trafficking, capture at war while crossing the border and diversion of stocks of SALW bolstered the capacity of armed organizations. At the same time, the capacity of armed groups became stronger through the proliferation of SALW from diverted stocks of state-owned SALW, field capture and illicit trafficking. Indeed, Afghanistan also illustrates the potential of an illicit drug–cultivated dependent relationship with a violent non-governmental actor, which can generate cycles of violence, create a weakened state, and pose a threat to regional and international security.

THE AMERICAS:

Historically, the region of the Americas has been the epicentre of the global cocaine economy, and 99% of the world's cocaine production and nearly all the world's coca cultivation takes place in the Americas, with Colombia, Peru and Bolivia being the primary nations. International estimates are of more than 3,000 tonnes of cocaine being manufactured in recent years worldwide, at record levels. Today, Colombia produces the majority of the world's cocaine, hundreds of thousands of hectares of coca each year, and is still the world's largest producer. The international cocaine trade is one of the most profitable drug markets, and is a primary source of revenue for organized crime and non-state armed groups in the Americas, generating tens of billions of U.S. dollars annually. The production process starts with the growing of coca bushes (Erythroxylum coca), the harvesting of leaves, and their processing into coca paste and ‘leaves;' from there, the leaves are further processed in clandestine labs to produce ‘coke;' cocaine base is then refined to become cocaine hydrochloride. The pathway of trafficking includes the Coca grower, processors, traffickers, transnational criminal networks, and armed groups collecting taxes on growers, processors, and traffickers.

There is no discussion of the cocaine economy in the Americas that does not mention Pablo Escobar, the founder and main boss of the Medellín Cartel. In the 1980s and early 1990s, this drug syndicate emerged as one of the biggest and most successful offenses of all time when it was estimated that it controlled approximately 80% of cocaine imports into the United States. It would generate between USD 400 and 420 million a week, over USD 20 billion a year, with Escobar's personal net worth estimated at over USD 25–30 billion by the time of his death. The Medellín Cartel operated secret laboratories, airstrips, maritime shipping routes, and deep entrant money laundering operations throughout the Americas. The organization's notorious policy ‘Plata o Plomo’ (Silver or Lead) bribed or assassinated politicians, judges, police officers, journalists and public officials who were against their activities. The cartel had been responsible for thousands of deaths including the bombing of Avianca Flight 203 with a bomb killing 107 people in 1989 and the Avianca headquarters of the Colombian intelligence agency, which also had a bombing, killing more than 50 people and leaving hundreds injured in 1989.

The enormous profits from the cocaine trade have in addition financed armed groups throughout the area. Historically, Colombian organized armed groups, like the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), have relied on taxation and protection of the coca-producing areas and trafficking corridors. When at its strongest, FARC had some two thousand troops, plus hundreds of millions of dollars a year in revenue from the illegal extraction of oil, coffee, gold, and coca, which allowed it to be one of the most sustained insurgencies in the Western hemi-spheric. Cocaine from the Andean region goes via numerous and complicated routes through Central America, the Caribbean and Mexico to the lucrative consumer markets of North America and Europe. This trade has left extortionate profits for organized criminal networks and led to corruption and violence, as well as the deterioration of state institutions in the region. As such, the Americas highlight the potential of the highly profitable narcotics market to fuel criminal networks, degrade governance and represent a lasting threat to regional and international security through the involvement of non-state armed groups.



International Criminal Networks and Organized Crime

Transnational organized crime consists of networks that engage in a range of criminal activities including drug and arms trafficking, cybercrime, environmental crime, human trafficking, illicit mining and money laundering. Transnational organized crime networks have become some of the biggest threats to world security. Global criminal economies account for about USD 1.6–2.2 trillion, which is around 2 to 3% of the total world GDP. Some of the services that transnational organized crime offers come at a huge cost and the United Nations estimates that the illegal drug trade is worth hundreds of billions of dollars annually. Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) have an illegal annual trade of USD 1 to 3 billion. Criminal organizations have the means to offer these services because of the large profits. This allows them to create a vast, international network to launder money and to bribe government officials.

The Sinaloa Cartel and the Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG) are two of the best known organized crime groups. The Sinaloa Cartel and CJNG are some of the most powerful international drug trafficking organizations and make billions of dollars from trafficking cocaine, heroin, methamphetamine and fentanyl. The 'Ndrangheta' of Italy, are regarded as one of the most powerful pieces of organized crime in the world. Trafficking cocaine and money laundering and extortion are reaping the group an estimated tens of billions of euros every year. Russian speaking organized crime, Balkan crime and West African trafficking networks have also established organized crime networks spanning multiple continents that facilitate trafficking drugs and arms, as well as human trafficking and cyber-crime.

Criminal networks are joining forces with non-state groups and insurgents for things like weapon buying, money laundering, and smuggling. These connections help criminals earn money, buy advanced weapons, and communications and even improve corruption which helps businesses undermine weakening state institutions. For this reason, international crime networks now create sophisticated challenges for security threats in strategic terms. These networks increase armed conflicts and terrorism and disturb efforts to establish peace, and legislative structure.

Tracking Diversions and Supplies:





Challenges in Tackling This Issue

The relationship between illicit trafficking, Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW), and non-state armed groups (NSAGs) is very complex and exceptionally difficult to break up, notwithstanding that various international frameworks exist. One of the biggest problems is the enormous profits of the illegal economies. The global illicit drug trade makes hundreds of billions of dollars a year in the United States and the global illicit SALW trade is estimated to contribute USD 1 – 3 billion yearly. These kinds of funds can be used for recruiting fighters, acquiring sophisticated arms, involving corrupt public officials, and adapting quickly to law enforcement efforts by criminal organizations and armed groups.

The second one is the lack of good governance, political instability and open borders. Conflict-affected areas like Afghanistan, Sahel and parts of Latin America frequently have an under-developed state presence and traffickers and armed groups may exercise control over territories or trafficking corridors. The condition of vast and ungoverned areas, weak border patrol capacity and insufficient institutional capacity makes interdiction operations very challenging and makes it easy to move drugs, weapons and illegal money over borders.

Another challenge is the convergence of transnational organized crime. and non-state armed groups. Many times, insurgent movements, terrorist groups, and criminal syndicates find ways to work together in mutually beneficial deals comprising elements of trafficking, money-laundering, and the procurement of arms. At the same time, however, corruption, lack of proper information sharing, varying national legislation and the application of international commitments remain as obstacles to cooperation at the international level. New technologies, encrypted communications, crypto currencies, and the development of increasingly complex financial networks just complicate the task of discovering, forging and prosecuting activity which is driving these illegal economies and armed conflicts.



Questions for Delegates to Consider

- How can the international community tackle the linkages of illicit drugs, SALWs and the financing of non-state armed groups without tackling underlying causes like poverty, weak governance and political instability?

- How can Member States intensify their efforts in border management and intelligence coordination and in international law enforcement cooperation to cut transnational trafficking networks and illicit financial flows?

- How can the diversion of Small Arms and Light Weapons into illegal supplies and/or into the hands of non-state armed groups be prevented?

- What are the opportunities to strengthen and better coordinate and implement existing international instruments, such as UNODC, UNTOC, The Arms Trade Treaty and INTERPOL mechanisms to tackle OCNs?

- How can financial monitoring mechanisms, asset recovery processes and anti-money laundering regimes help to break the economic backbone of trafficking networks and armed groups?

- What is the right balance to strike between effective counter-trafficking and counter-terrorism measures and respect for human rights, humanitarian rules and respect for state sovereignty?

- How can regional cooperation be strengthened in conflict areas, where cross-border trafficking is a reality and state institutions are unable to control?

Conclusive Note

The link between illicit drug trafficking and Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) and the finance of non-state armed groups is one of the most multi-faceted and complex security issues facing the international community today. These interrelated risks cross borders, challenge governance and the rule of law, aggravate humanitarian conditions, and fuel cycles of violence and instability on the regional level. Their longstanding resolve serves as an example of the need to not only respond to criminal and armed groups that are becoming more adaptive and transnational, but to also do so in an integrated and state-led manner.

As they get under deliberation, the delegates are encouraged to break from the traditionalist paradigm and do critical analysis on the nexus of security, development, governance and international cooperation. This committee must not only break up illegal networks, but create innovative and sustainable solutions that tackle the immediate manifestation, as well as the structural causes, of these threats. The effectiveness of the global response will greatly be dependent on the joint political will and commitment of the Member States to intensifying international cooperation, the rule of law and the maintenance of peace and security.

It is reminded once again that Model United Nations is not only about presenting arguments, but also about listening attentively, understanding diverse viewpoints, and learning from one another through respectful diplomacy. The Executive Board wishes all delegates a valuable and enriching learning experience and looks forward to productive committee sessions.

Best Regards,

Executive Board,

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)

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